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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
of customary international law to the effect that immunity from civil suit is granted." 5 Although
the Court accorded the United States immunity on the ground of an act jure imperii, it is open
to question whether the distinction made by the Court between acts jure imperiiandjuregestionis
mattered at all in this case. As is well known, there is a tendency toward the restriction of
immunity in cases relating to death or personal injury in the forum state,36 regardless of the
character of the act in question. 7 This approach can be observed not only in the states, in-
cluding the United States, that have foreign state immunity statutes, but also in Greece, which
does not have such a statute.3" The writer is of the opinion that in some types of tort proceed-
ings against a foreign state, the exercise ofjurisdiction without making a distinction between
acts jure imperiiand juregestionis does not constitute a violation of customary international law. °
If so, then the exercise ofjurisdiction in the Yokota Base case might have been permissible under
customary international law even if the Supreme Court was correct in applying state immu-
nity under customary international law in this case and in classifying the activity at issue as
an act jure imperii. The Court should then have examined a variety of questions, including:
Could the noise of aircraft be said to cause "personal injury" for purposes of a tort excep-
tion?' Couldjurisdiction be exercised with regard to the claim for an injunction?4 It is unfor-
tunate that the Court left these issues and others to be considered in the future.
MIZUSHIMA TOMONORI
Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University
Human rights--transnational abductions--extraterritorial application of International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights-non-self-executing treaties
UNITED STATES V. DUARTE-ACERO. 296 F.3d 1277, cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 573.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, July 12, 2002.
In United States v. Duarte-Acero,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not regulate the extraterritorial con-
duct of U.S. government agents. Additionally, the court held that the Covenant is not self-exe-
cuting and therefore that it does not create individual rights that are judicially enforceable
in U.S. courts.
" Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 5, at 731.
36 See, e.g., CHIUSTOPH H. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 44 (1988).
37 See, e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980) (immunity denied despite the apparently
sovereign character of the act at issue).
" See, e.g., Prefecture ofVoiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No. 11/2000 (Hellenic Sup. Ct. May 4, 2000)
(discussed in case report by Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas at 95 AJIL 198,199 (2001)); butseeFOx, supra note 17,
at 412 (questioning the approach of the Hellenic Supreme Court since "the injury was sustained in time of war
by the armed forces of an occupying government").
" See Mizushima Tomonori, Fuhokdi Sosh5 ni Okeru Kokusaihd jo no Gaikoku Kokka Menjo [Foreign State Immunity
Under InternationalLaw in Tort Proceedings] (pts. 1 & 2), HOGAKU RONSO [KYOTO L. REv.], Sept. 2002, at 120, & Dec.
2002, at 113.
' In a Canadian case raising a similar question, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the interpretation by
the Court of Appeal for Ontario that "personal injury" in section 6(a) of the Canadian State Immunity Act, R.S.C.,
ch. S-18 (1985), reprinted in 21 ILM 798 (1982), required physical injury. Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General),
216 D.L.R. 513 (Sup. Ct. 2002), affg196 D.L.R. 281 (Ontario C.A. 2001). With an amendment made by the Federal
Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, Act of May 10, 2001, S.C. 2001, ch. 4, §121 (1), available at <http://
www.parl.gc.ca/PDF/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/S-4_4.pdf>, the relevant part ofsection
6(a) now reads "personal or bodily injury."
41 Section 13(2) of the UK State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, reprinted in 17 ILM 1123 (1978), provides that relief
shall not be given against a state by way of injunction. See also FOX, supra note 17, at 508.
'United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 573 (2002) [hereinafter Duarte II].
For Duarte I, see infra note 11 and accompanying text.
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In February 1982,Jose Duarte-Acero and his three co-conspirators kidnapped two Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents from their hotel room in Cartagena, Colombia.2
The four men shot and injured the DEA agents, but the agents survived.3 Duarte, a Colombian
citizen, was convicted by a Colombian court of kidnapping and attempted murder. He served
time in a Colombian prison until he was released in December 1984.4 Meanwhile, inJune 1982,
a U.S. indictment was issued against Duarte for conspiring to kill the two DEA agents, in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. §1117 (which prohibits conspiracy to commit murder). The U.S. request to
extradite Duarte was denied, however, by the Corte Suprema dejustical, Colombia's highest
court.5 Thus, in the eyes of the Colombian legal system, Duarte was a free man after his 1984
release from prison.
In August 1997, two undercover DEA agents, posing as the proprietors of a Colombian busi-
ness, asked Duarte to be the manager of a new branch office. Duarte flew to Bogota to meet
with them.6 Having lured Duarte to Bogota under false pretenses, the undercover DEA agents
then told him that they needed his help in transporting some computers from Ecuador to
Colombia. Duarte crossed the border into Ecuador for the purpose of retrieving the computers.
Upon his entry into Ecuador, Ecuadorian police arrested Duarte, informed him "that he was
being excluded from Ecuador and turned him over to [DEA] agents." 7 Duarte asked several
times to speak with the Colombian Consulate, but his requests were ignored.8 Instead, his cap-
tors placed him on a DEA airplane and flew him to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to stand trial
on the federal criminal charges on which he had been indicted.
In his first motion to dismiss the indictment, Duarte argued that prosecution in the United
States for the crimes committed in Colombia would violate the doublejeopardy provision-
Article 14(7)-of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights9 (ICCPR) because
he had already been convicted and sentenced for the same crimes in Colombia. The district
court denied Duarte's motion to dismiss the indictment,"0 and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
(in Duarte I)." The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the ICCPR's double jeopardy provision
bars successive prosecutions by the same state but not by two different states. 2 In support of
this conclusion, the court cited a decision of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) ,1" which
the court described as "a major source for interpretation of the ICCPR.' 14
Duarte then filed a second motion in district court to dismiss the indictment," invoking
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.16 He also claimed that the United
2 Duarte It, supra note 1, at 1278-79.
3 SeeUnited States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984).
' Duarte II, supra note 1, at 1279.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1037 (S.D. Fla. 2001) [hereinafter Duarte II (district court)].
The court's statement that Duarte was being "excluded" from Ecuador presumably meant that Ecuador treated
him something like an "excludable alien" under U.S. immigration law. Prior to 1996, that term referred to an alien
ineligible for admission into the United States. The current statute refers to "inadmissible" aliens. See Rosales-Garcia v.
Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 391 n.1 (6th Cir. 2003).
Duarte 11 (district court), supra note 7, at 1037.
" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Article 14(7)
provides: "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally
convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country."
0 United States v. Benitez, 28 F.Supp.2d 1361 (S.D. Fla. 1998) [hereinafter Duarte I (district court)].
United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Duarte I].
12 Id. at 1286-87.
" The Human Rights Committee, an expert body created by the ICCPR, is responsible for monitoring its imple-
mentation. See ICCPR, supra note 9, Arts. 28-45.
"4 Duarte 1, supra note 11, at 1287-88 (quoting Maria v. McElroy, 68 F.Supp.2d 206, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
'5 Duarte 11 (district court), supra note 7.
"Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, Art. 36,596 UNTS 261 ("Communication and Con-
tact with Nationals of the Sending State").
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States had violated ICCPR Articles 9, 12(4), 13, and 14(1) by forcibly abducting him to the
United States. The district court rejected Duarte's Vienna Convention defense on the ground
that "dismissal of an indictment is not an appropriate remedy" for violations of Article 36
of the Vienna Convention.17 The court rejected Duarte's ICCPR defenses on the ground that
U.S. agents do not have a duty to comply with the ICCPR when they act "outside the United
States and within the boundaries of another country."
18
Duarte was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. After his conviction, Duarte
appealed the district court ruling on the ICCPR defenses raised in his second motion to dis-
miss. 9 On two alternative grounds, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed (in DuarteII) " the district
court's rejection of those defenses. First, the circuit court held that Ecuador, not the United
States, was the party responsible for violating the ICCPR. In support of this position, the court
cited ICCPR Article 2 (1), which provides: "Each State Party to the present Covenant under-
takes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to itsjurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant . 21 In the court's view,
the plain language of the ICCPR indicates that its provisions govern the relationship be-
tween a State and the individuals within the State's territory.... All of the violations alleged
by Duarte occurred in Ecuador, not the United States. The United States is not obligated
to provide relief for alleged violations of the ICCPR committed by other nations. 
2
Alternatively, the court held that the ICCPR is not self-executing and is therefore not bind-
ing on federal courts. In support of this proposition, the court cited the non-self-executing
declaration ("NSE declaration") adopted by the United States and included in its instrument
of ratification. That declaration explicitly provides that "Articles 1 through 27 of the [ICCPR]
are not self-executing." 2 As the Eleventh Circuit explained,
the ICCPR does not createjudicially-enforceable individual rights. Treaties affect United
States law only if they are self-executing or otherwise given effect by congressional legis-
lation. Articles 1 through 27 of the ICCPR are not self-executing. Nor has Congress passed
implementing legislation. Therefore, the ICCPR is not binding on federal courts.
24
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Duante II is the latest in a series of cases in which U.S.
courts have ruled in favor of the government after U.S. government agents kidnapped indi-
viduals from foreign countries and brought them to the United States to stand trial on federal
criminal charges.2 5 Nevertheless, DuartelFs factual similarity to other transnational forcible-
abduction cases obscures its legal significance as the first such case in which a criminal defen-
dant in the United States has raised the ICCPR as a defense.
On at least two occasions, the HRC has considered whether transnational forcible abduction
violates the ICCPR. In one case, Uruguayan government agents, aided byArgentine paramilitary
"7 Duarte II (district court), supra note 7, at 1038.
'8 Id. at 1040.
9 The appeal also raised federal statutory issues, Duarte II, supra note 1, at 1283-84, and presented a defense based
on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, id. at 1281-82. This comment focuses on his ICCPR defenses.
21 See supra note 1.
21 ICCPR, supra note 9, Art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
2 Duarte II, supra note 1, at 1283.
23 138 Cong. Rec. S4783-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992); see also MULTILATERALTREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRE-
TARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DEC. 2001, at 192, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/20 (2002) (reprinting text of U.S.
instrument of ratification deposited with the United Nations) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].
24 Duarte II, supra note 1, at 1283 (citations omitted).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that forcible abduction of Mexican
doctor from Mexico to United States did not violate U.S. extradition treaty with Mexico); United States v. Matta-
Ballesteros, 71 F.3;d 754 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming conviction of Honduran national who was tried in federal court
on federal criminal charges after being abducted from his home in Honduras by U.S. government agents).
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groups, kidnapped a Uruguayan national who was living in Argentina and forcibly abducted
him to Uruguay. 6 In another case, Uruguayan agents, working with Brazilian police officials,
kidnapped a Uruguayan citizen from her apartment in Brazil and forcibly abducted her to
Uruguay.27 In both cases the HRC held that Uruguay was responsible for ICCPR violations
committed by its agents outside of Uruguayan territory, 28 and in both cases the HRC also specif-
ically rejected the interpretation of Article 2(1) adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Duarte I.
The HRC said: "[I] t would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2
of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the ter-
ritory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory. "29
The HRC's interpretation of the ICCPR is not binding on U.S. courts. In DuarteI, however,
the Eleventh Circuit explicitly stated that the HRC's "decisions in individual cases are recog-
nized as a major source for interpretation of the ICCPR."30 In light of this statement in Duarte I,
the Eleventh Circuit in Duarte I!should, at a minimum, have explained why it adopted an in-
terpretation ofICCPRArticle 2 (1) that directly contradicted the HRC's interpretation of the
same article in factually similar circumstances. Regrettably, though, the court in Duartelldid
not even mention the views of the HRC.
The views of the HRC are supported by the language of Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR, which
states: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to itsjurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant . .."' There are at least three possible ways to interpret the phrase "and subject
to itsjurisdiction" in Article 2(1).32
One possible interpretation is that the phrase has the same meaning as the immediately
preceding phrase-"within its territory"-in which case the phrase "and subject to itsjurisdic-
tion" would be entirely redundant. That is the interpretation adopted by the Eleventh Circuit
in Duarte II, but it is an interpretation that must be rejected since legal documents should
not be construed in a manner that renders certain words superfluous. The ICCPR's drafters
presumably intended to modify the phrase "within its territory" in some fashion by adding the
words "and subject to its jurisdiction."
A second possibility is that the phrase "and subject to itsjurisdiction" was intended to limit
the scope of the ICCPR so that the rights recognized therein extend only to a subset of indiv-
iduals within a state's territory-that is, to those individuals within its territory who are also
subject to its jurisdiction. One consequence of such an interpretation might be, for example,
that foreign ambassadors would not receive the benefit of ICCPR rights because they are not
"subject to thejurisdiction" of the state in whose territory they are located. Thomas Buergenthal,
now sitting on the International Court of'Justice, has observed, " [T] hat reading of Article 2 (1)
"6 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52 (June 6, 1979), UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40),
at 176 (1981). The cases of the Human Rights Committee are available online at<http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/
undocs/undocs.htm>.
27 Celiberti v. Uruguay, Communication No. R. 13/56 (July 17,1979), UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40), at 185
(1981).
21 See Lopez Burgos, para. 13 (holding that Uruguay violated "article 9(1) because the act of abduction into Urti-
guayan territory constituted an arbitrary arrest and detention"); Celiberti, para. 11 (same). ICCPRArticle 9(1) provides,
in part: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law."
' ' Celiberti, para. 10.3; see Lopez Burgos, para. 12.3.
Duarte I, supra note 11, at 1288 (quoting Maria v. McElroy, 68 F.Supp.2d 206, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
s' ICCPR, supra note 9, Art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
32 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that treaty provisions are to be construed "in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 31(1), 1155 UNTS 331. Although
the United States is not a party to the Convention, the U.S. Department of State has often acknowledged that many
of the Convention's provisions reflect customary international law. Moreover, several courts of appeals have cited
the Convention as an authoritative source for rules of treaty interpretation. See generally Maria Frankowska, The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA.J. INT'L L. 281 (1988).
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is specious and would produce results that were clearly not intended."3 Indeed, as Buergenthal
noted, under that interpretation Article 12 (4) of the ICCPR-which protects the right of an
individual to enter his own country-would be utterly meaningless because Article 2 (1) would
deny protection to the only people whom Article 12 (4) could conceivably protect: those who
are outside their own country.
34
The third possible interpretation is that the phrase "and subject to itsjurisdiction" was in-
tended to expand the scope of ICCPR rights so that they extend to two groups of individuals:
those who are within a state's territory, and those who are outside the state's territory but
nevertheless subject to itsjurisdiction. This is the only interpretation that is consistent with
both Article 2(1)'s plain meaning and the ICCPR's object and purpose.3 5 It is unclear under
this interpretation whether the ICCPR applies to the actions of the DEA agents who seized
Duarte in Ecuador because it is unclear whether Duarte was "subject to the jurisdiction" of
the United States, within the meaning of Article 2(1), from the moment they seized him. 6
In any event, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Duarte/!was flawed because the court's inter-
pretation of Article 2 (1) ignored the phrase "subject to itsjurisdiction" and focused exclusively
on the phrase "within its territory."
The Eleventh Circuit's alternative holding-that the ICCPR is not binding on U.S. courts
because it is not self-executing-is also subject to criticism. Again, it is instructive to compare
Duarte Iwith Duarte I. In Duarte I, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly stated that upon U.S. ratifi-
cation the ICCPR "became, coexistent with the United States Constitution and federal stat-
utes, the supreme law of the land."3 7 In other words, even though the United States declared
the ICCPR to be non-self-executing, the ICCPR is still the law of the land under the Suprem-
acy Clause 5 -which is the conclusion that has been reached by every U.S. court that has
specifically addressed the issue. 9 Moreover, the Senate record associated with ratification of
the ICCPR makes clear that the NSE declaration was not intended to deprive the ICCPR of its
constitutional status as supreme law of the land.4" Therefore, although the court in Duarte//
did not explicitly address the ICCPR's status under the Supremacy Clause, it is fair to assume that
the Eleventh Circuit's non-self-execution holding in Duarte !!was not intended to repudiate
that court's statement in Duartelthat the ICCPR is "the supreme law of the land."'"
" Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVILAND POLITIcAL RIGHTS 72, 74 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
34 Id.
s Accord, id. at 73-77.
s( Buergenthal suggested that the phrase "subject to its jurisdiction" in Article 2(1) means that a state is liable
for the extraterritorial acts of its agents who exercise "actual authority and responsibility." Id. at 76-77. Under this
interpretation, the United States would be liable for the actions of the DEA agents who seized Duarte if they exer-
cised "actual authority" over Duarte in Ecuador.
37 Duarte I, supra note 11, at 1284.
'8 See U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2 ("all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
" SeeMaria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp.2d 206, 231-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Although the ICCPR is not self-executing,
it is an international obligation of the United States and constitutes a law of the land."); Duarte I (district court),
supra note 10, at 1363 (stating that ICCPR "is the supreme law of the land"); State v. Carpenter, 69 S.W.3d 568, 578
(Tenn. 2001) (stating that ICCPR "is the supreme law of the land").41 SeeDavid Sloss, TheDomestication oflnternationalHuman Rights: Non-Self-ExecutingDeclarations and Human Rights
Treaties, 24 YaleJ. Int'l L. 129,152-71 (1999) (providing detailed analysis of Senate record associated with ratifica-
tion of human rights treaties) [hereinafter, Sloss, Domestication].
4 A contrary interpretation-that the NSE declaration deprives the ICCPRof its constitutional status as supreme
law of the land-would raise potential constitutional difficulties. In a recent article, I provided a detailed defense
of the thesis that the treaty makers (that is, the president and the Senate together, acting pursuant to the Article II
treaty power) do not have the constitutional power to deprive a treaty of its status as supreme federal law by expres-
sing their intent to do so. See David Sloss, Non-selfexecuting Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1 (2002). In brief, the argument can be summarized as follows. Nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions
related to the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties support two propositions. First, there are constitutional limits
on the treaty makers' power to create domestic law by means of treaties. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190
20031
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In 1992, when recommending to the Senate that the United States include an NSE decla-
ration in its instrument of ratification for the ICCPR, the Bush administration explained that the
"intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts. 4 2
Accordingly, the district court in DuarteIlcorrectly noted that "[c] ourts have uniformly held
that there is no private cause of action under the ICCPR."43 The court added, however, that
"because Defendant is raising his ICCPR claims defensively, this limitation does not apply."44
Thus, according to the district court in Duarte II, the NSE declaration had no relevance to
Duarte's ICCPR defense. That declaration prevents plaintiffs from invoking the ICCPR in order
to establish a private cause of action, but not in order to establish a defense to a criminal
prosecution.4
5
In contrast to the district court, the Eleventh Circuit in DuarteHapparently believed that
the NSE declaration barred both offensive and defensive applications of the ICCPR. The Elev-
enth Circuit did not, however, offer any explanation orjustification for this interpretation.
The court merely said that "the ICCPR does not createjudicially-enforceable individual rights. ' '46
There are three possible interpretations of this statement: (1) the ICCPR does not create indiv-
idual rights under international law; (2) the ICCPR does not create individual rights under
domestic law, even though it creates individual rights under international law; and (3) the ICCPR
is notjudicially enforceable, even though it creates individual rights under both domestic
and international law.4 7
If, on the first interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit meant to say that the ICCPR does not
create individual rights under international law, then its non-self-execution holding is based
on a mistaken understanding of the law. There are, to be sure, many examples of treaty pro-
visions that do not create individual rights under international law.48 The specific ICCPR pro-
visions at issue in DuarteI, however, unquestionably aim to protect individuals and do create
individual rights under international law. For example, Duarte relied on ICCPRArticle 9 (1),
which provides: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are
established by law." It is evident from the plain meaning of this language that the drafters
intended to confer rights on individuals under international law.
What, then, about the second possibility-that the ICCPR does not create individual rights
as a matter of domestic law, even though it creates individual rights under international law?
If that is what the Eleventh Circuit meant to say, then its non-self-execution holding is founded
(1888). Second, there are some treaty provisions that are notjudicially enforceable even though they have the status
of supreme federal law under the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) ("Head Money
Cases"); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). The authors of the Restatement (Second) ofthe Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (1965) invoked these nineteenth-century decisions in support of what was, in fact, a very
different theory of non-self-execution: the theory that a treaty has the status of supreme federal law if and only if
the treaty makers intended it to have thatstatus (see § 141). My article defends the original doctrine associated with
those nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions, but I argue that the Restatement doctrine should be abandoned:
it is at odds with the text and structure of the Constitution, has no basis in Supreme Court precedent, and subverts
both rule of law and separation of powers values without advancing any legitimate policy goal.
12 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CML AND POLITIcAL RIGHTS: REPORT,
S. EXEc. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19 (1992).
" Duarte II (district court), supra note 7, at 1040 n.8.
44 Id.
" SeeSloss, Domestication, supra note 40 (providing detailed defense of thesis that NSE declarations attached to
human rights treaties preclude reliance on treaties to establish private cause of action, but do not preclude defensive
application of treaties).
46 Duarte II, supra note 1, at 1283.
47 All three versions assume that the ICCPR is the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause.
" See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (Cal. 1952) (holding that Articles 55 and 56 of UN Charter, which
obligate member states to "takejoint and separate action" to promote human rights, are notjudicially enforceable
since they do not create individual rights).
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upon a dubious, unstated constitutional assumption. Article II of the Constitution gives the
treaty makers--the president and Senate-the power to make international treaties.4 9 The
Supremacy Clause accords such treaties the domestic status of supreme federal law. The treaty
makers do, of course, have the power to adopt reservations that limit or modify the scope of
the United States' international obligations under a treaty.5 ° The NSE declarations attached
to human rights treaties were not intended, however, to limit or modify the United States'
international obligations.5' In addition, when the treaty makers adopt a valid reservation, the
treaty has the same meaning both domestically and internationally. In contrast, the NSE dec-
laration-under this interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit's non-self-execution holding-
modifies the domestic meaning of the treaty without altering its international meaning. Thus,
under this interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit's non-self-execution holding necessarily pre-
supposes that Article II grants the treaty makers an affirmativeconstitutional power to create
domestic law that is different from the international law created by the treaty.52 The Eleventh
Circuit in Duarte II provides no justification for the claim that the treaty makers have such a
constitutional power.
The remaining option is the third-that the Eleventh Circuit's non-self-execution holding
may be interpreted to mean that the ICCPR is not judicially enforceable as a matter of do-
mestic law, even though it creates individual rights as the law of the land under the Suprem-
acy Clause.5" On such an interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit's non-self-execution holding
raises still other constitutional difficulties. Granted, the political branches have virtually unlim-
ited control over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. But there is no question that the
district court and the Eleventh Circuit both had jurisdiction over Duarte's case. Therefore,
under this interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit decision, the NSE declaration is tanta-
mount to a direct order from the treaty makers to the courts, telling the courts not to apply
supreme federal law in a case where they havejurisdiction, even if an individual defendant's
federal rights have been violated.54 There is no authority for the proposition that the political
branches have the constitutional power to order a federal court that has jurisdiction over a case
to refrain from applying supreme federal law when a criminal defendant alleges a violation
'9 U.S. CONST. Art. II, §2, cl. 2.
'o SeeVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 32, Art. 19. The United States adopted several reser-
vations when it ratified the ICCPR. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 23, at 192. None of the U.S. reservations,
however, are relevant to Duarte's ICCPR defense.
5 1 See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ONTHE ELIMINATION
OFALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, S. EXEC. REP. No. 103-29, at 26 (1994) ("Declaring the Convention to
be non-self-executing in no way lessens the obligation of the United States to comply with its provisions as a matter
of international law.").
12 The treaty makers' power to create individual rights under domestic law is subject to constitutional limitations.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONSLAWOFTHE UNITED STATES §115(3) (1987). If the treaty makers
undertake an international obligation that conflicts with the Constitution, then there would be a discrepancy between
the "international treaty" and the "domestic treaty." In that case, the discrepancy between the domestic and inter-
national scope of the treaty arises from a constitutional limitation on the treaty power. By contrast, in claiming that
the treaty makers have the power to make a treaty that has different meanings domestically and internationally, one
presupposes that Article II confers on the treaty makers an affirmative powerto create domestic law that is different
from the international law created by the treaty. That interpretation of Article II requires, at a minimum,justifica-
tion or explanation. SeeJOHN NORTON MOORE, TREATYINTERPRETATION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OFLAW
28-30 (2001) (contending that treaty makers lack constitutional power to make a treatywith a domestic meaning
that differs from its international meaning).
" The Eleventh Circuit's statement that "the ICCPR is not binding on federal courts," Duarte II, supra note 1,
at 1283, is consistent with this interpretation of its non-self-execution holding.
54 This version of the Eleventh Circuit's non-self-execution holding is similar to avariant of the political question
doctrine endorsed occasionally by the executive branch, which David Bederman has described as follows: "[A] ny
case implicating a treaty right is, upon the election of the executive branch, capable of being characterized as a polit-
ical question and thus rendered nonjusticiable." DavidJ. Bederman, Deference orDeception: Treaty Rights as Political
Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1483 (1999) (describing the argument advanced by the United States in an
amicus brief submitted to the Fourth Circuit in Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998)).
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of his federally protected rights.55 Indeed, any system that grants the political branches such
power over the judiciary is fundamentally incompatible with constitutional safeguards for
an independentjudiciary.
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit's non-self-execution holding in DuarteIIraises more questions
than it answers. The Eleventh Circuit should have followed the district court in Duarne II,
which correctly observed that the NSE declaration was irrelevant to Duarte's ICCPR defense
because that declaration merely prevents plaintiffs from invoking the ICCPR to establish a
private cause of action.
DAVID L. SLOSS
St. Louis University School of Law
5 Of course, the Eleventh Circuit never reached the question whether Duarte's ICCPR ights were violated. Indeed,
what is most disturbing about the court's opinion is that the court apparently believed that the question whether
those rights were violated was of no consequence.
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